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I. INTRODUCTION
The number of lawsuits based on secondary school
sports
injuries has increased at an alarming rate during the past decade.
This development has caused persons involved in all aspects of
school sports to reassess their individual vulnerability to a claim of
negligence by an injured athlete. In recent litigation, injured
athletes have sued everyone associated with the local school district,
including the superintendent, the principal, the coaches, the game
officials, and the equipment manufacturers. The vulnerability of
the school district and its administrative officials to claims by
injured athletes is often based upon the argument that coaches and
officials are employees of the district, and that under the doctrine of
respondeat superior, responsibility for the negligent conduct of these
employees is shifted to the employer.'
The doctrine of respondeat superior is based on the premise that
an employer is best able to bear the costs resulting from an
employee's negligent acts. 2 Practically speaking, what this has
meant to an injured sports plaintiff is that he or she can reach the
varied assets and resources of the school district by either working
out a settlement, or by obtaining damages in court. Under the
doctrine of respondeat superior, courts in a number of states have
imposed liability against school districts for injuries suffered by
participants in athletic events. 3
Carabba v. Anacortes School DistrictNo. 103 4 is representative of
1. A leading authority on agency law explains the doctrine of respondeat superioras follows:
The general rule is that a master is liable for the unauthorized torts of his servant
committed while the servant is acting within the scope of his employment. Where the
master-servant relationship is shown to exist, the master is strictly liable for the torts of
his servant within that scope. This doctrine is variously called 'respondeat superior' or
'vicarious liability' since it is said that the servant's tortious conduct is imputed to his
master.
W. SELL, AGENCY § 95, at 84 (1975); see also H. REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, HANDBOOK ON THE.LAW
OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIe S 52, at 101-04 (Ist ed. 1979) (general discussion of the doctrine of
respondeat superior).
2. W. SELL, AGENCY S 95 (1975). Sell contends that under the doctrine of respondeat superior,
"[Iliability is said to arise in return for the benefits received by the principal through the exercise of
the privilege of controlling others in his house or business enterprise. It is further justified on the
ground that the master may spread the risks of his enterprise through insurance." Id. 5 95, at 84
(footnotes omitted).
3. See, e.g., Larson v. Independent School Dist. No. 314, 289 N.W.2d 112, 123 (Minn. 1980)
(student injured in physical education class as a result of negligence of coach and principal allowed to
recover from school district under theory of vicarious liability); Brahatcek v. Millard School Dist.
No. 17, 202 Neb. 86,
-, 273 N.W.2d 680, 686-87 (1979) (school district responsible for death of
student caused by golf instructor's lack of supervision); Chappel v. Franklin Pierce School Dist. No.
402, 71 Wash. 2d 17,
-,
426 P.2d 471, 475 (1967) (school district liable for acts of faculty
supervising an extracurricular initiation ceremony).
4.72 Wash. 2d 939, 435 P.2d 936 (1968).
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the potential liability of school districts. In Carabba a claim was
brought against two school districts to recover damages based on
injuries suffered by a high school athlete while participating in a
wrestling match.' The plaintiff contended that the referee was
negligent for failing to properly supervise the match, 6 and thus, the
school districts were vicariously liable for the negligence of their
agent, the referee. 7 The Washington Supreme Court determined
that the school districts owed a duty to their student particpaniis
because the wrestling matches were conducted "under the
auspices" of the districts.8 The court determined that the school
districts owed a nondelegable duty to provide adequate
supervision and that the school districts could be held vicariously
liable for the negligence of the referee officiating the wrestling
match. 9 Accordingly, the court reversed a jury verdict for the
defendant school districts and directed that a new trial be
conducted in accordance with its holding that the school districts
owed a duty to the injured athlete. ' 0
Although there is only one reported court decision in North
Dakota in which an injured athlete has made a negligence claim
based on inadequate supervision of an athletic event,"I it is obvious
that school districts, as well as all other persons involved with
amateur school sports in this state, must be prepared for such a
possibility. This Article analyzes the legal liability of those persons
who play an integral role in the administration of school sports in
North Dakota.
To accomplish the above stated objectives, this Article is
divided into three sections. The first section discusses the claims
based on sports related injuries and details exactly what an injured
plaintiff athlete must prove in order to successfully establish these
claims. In the second section a survey of national case law is
5. Carabba v. Anacortes School Dist. No. 103, 72 Wash. 2d 939, -,
435 P.2d 936, 938
(1968). The plaintiff was injured in a wrestling match when he was placed in an illegal hold by his
opponent. Id. at -,
435 P.2d at 939. The opponent was able to apply the illegal hold because the
referee's attention was momentarily diverted from the match. Id.
6. Id. at
-, 435 P.2d at 938. The plaintiff alleged that the referee allowed the opponent to
apply and maintain an illegal and dangerous hold. Id.

7. d.
8. Id. at

__,

435 P.2d at 947. The.court noted that the school districts actively encouraged

participation by students, provided coaches for training, provided the premises to host the athlete
activities, and provided the equipment used in the wrestling matches. Id.
9. See id. at -,
435 P.2d at 948. The court determined that the duty owed by the school
districts to the participants in the wrestling match "is similar to that imposed upon the school
districts while the students are in involuntary attendance during school hours, i.e. a duty to provide
non-negligent supervision." Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Ov AGENCY 5 214 comment a (1957)).
10. Carabba, 72 Wash. 2d at -, 435 P.2d at 948.

11. See Harding v. New Rockford School Dist. No. I, Civ. No. 2220 (S.E.D.N.D. Mar. 11,
1986). For a discussion of Harding, see infra notes 151-58 and accompanying text.
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presented to demonstrate the parameters of negligence liability
currently applicable to school districts, administrators, coaches,
and officials. This section discusses the employment relationship
between the relevant parties to a sports negligence lawsuit and
provides examples of the type of conduct that may lead to a lawsuit.
Finally, the Article concludes. by presenting suggestions concerning
how school districts and other interested parties can protect
themselves from unnecessary exposure to sports negligence
lawsuits.
II. ESTABLISHING THE TORT CLAIM IN SPORTS CASES
A.

INTENTIONAL TORTS

An intentional tort claim requires the plaintiff to prove that the
tortfeasor desired to cause the consequences of his or her act, or
that the tortfeasor knew with substantial certainty that his or her
actions would cause the damages in question. 2 Probably the most
common intentional torts in sports law cases are assault and
battery. Assault involves the imposition of a threat of immediate
injury. 3 Battery is the intentional harmful or offensive touching
4
of another.1
Intentional tort theories are employed in sports cases primarily
when an athlete brings an action against another participant for
wrongful conduct that was clearly intended to inflict personal
injury and that was in violation of the sport's rules. In Griggas v.
Clausen' 5 the plaintiff was playing in an amateur basketball game
when, as he was about to receive a pass from a teammate, the
defendant "pushed him and struck him in the face.' ' 6 The
defendant struck the plaintiff again as he was falling to the floor. 7
As a result of his injuries, the plaintiff lay on the floor unconscious
for fifteen minutes and later required hospital treatment for various
bruises, lacerations, and cuts. 18 In upholding the jury verdict in
12. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE-LAW OF TORTS S 8, at 31 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS 5 8A (1965).
13. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TIE.LAW OF
ToRTS S 10, at 43 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
14. Id. S 9, at 39.
15.6 111. App. 2d 412, 128 N.E.2d 363 (1955).
16. Griggas v. Clausen, 6 11. App. 2d 412, 413, 128 N. E.2d 363, 364 (1955).
17. Id. Witnesses to the incident testified that the defendant was swearing profusely, even while
the plaintiff was lying on the floor unconscious. Id.
18. Id. The plaintiff required treatment for several weeks as a result of his injuries. Id. The
plaintiff's right temple was badly bruised and swollen, and his mouth and lips were cut and swollen
at the time he was admitted to the hospital. Id. In addition, he suffered constant headaches and his
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favor of the plaintiff, the court noted that the plaintiff had been
"subjected to a wanton and unprovoked assault and was struck at a
time when he had his back to defendant."' 19 The court also upheld
the jury's award of exemplary damages due to the severity of the.
injuries inflicted. 2 0
In a similar case, Averill v. Luttrell,2 1 the plaintiff Luttrell, a
baseball batter, filed suit for assault and battery after being struck
by Averill, the catcher for the opposing team. 22 The altercation was
precipitated when Luttrell was nearly hit by three pitches, and then
was struck by the fourth. 23 Plaintiff responded by throwing his bat
at the opposing pitcher, and thereafter the defendant rendered the
plaintiff unconscious with a blow to the side of the head. 24
Luttrell sued both Averill and the opposing baseball club. 25
The plaintiff sued the club under the doctrine of respondeat superior
on the ground that Averill was acting within the scope of his
employment as the agent of the club and in furtherance of its
business. 26 Although the court recognized that the assault by the
catcher "was no part of the ordinary risks expected to be
encountered in sportsmanlike play," it refused to hold the
defendant's baseball team liable for the tort. 27 The court reasoned
that the assault "was neither incident to nor in the furtherance of
[the catcher's] employer's business," and therefore dismissed the
suit against the employer baseball team. 28 This dismissal prevented
the plaintiff from reaching the assets of the baseball team, and thus
left Averill solely responsible for the assault and battery.2 9
Proving intent in a sports injury case can be difficult. This is
especially true in traditional contact sports such as football, in
which a certain level of aggressiveness is allowed if it is within the
eyesight deteriorated so that he had to wear glasses. Id. at 415, 128 N.E.2d at 364-65. Finally,
because of his injuries, the plaintiff lost a four year basketball scholarship at DePaul University that
provided for room and board, books, tuition, and incidental fees. Id. at 415, 128 N.E.2d at 365.
19. Id. at 418, 128 N.E.2d at 366.
20. Id. Although the hospital and doctor bills totalled $362.10, the court reasoned that an award
of $2000 was not excessive since it was within the jury's power to grant exemplary damages for a
wanton and unprovoked attack. See id. at 419, 128 N. E.2d at 366.
21. 44 Tenn. App. 56, 311 S.W.2d 812 (1957).
22. Averill v. Luttrell, 44 Tenn. App. 56, ..
, 311 S.W.2d 812, 813 (1957).
23. Id.
24. Id. at -,
311 S.W.2d at 814. The force of the blow rendered the plaintiff unconscious,
and he suffered a fractured jaw after falling face irst to the ground. Id. The plaintiff was taken by
ambulance to the hospital and the defendant Averill was arrested. Id.
25. Id. at-,
311 S.W.2d at 812.
26. Id. at...,
311 S.W.2d at 813.
27. Id. at._, 311 S.W.2d at 814.
28. Id. at -,
311 S.W.2d at 814-15. The court determined that the doctrine of respondeat
superior did not apply because a master is generally not liable for the willful acts of a servant who
commits an act wholly independent and foreign to the scope of his employment. Id. at __
, 311
S.W.2d at 814.
29. See id. at __, 311 S.W.2d at 815.
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parameters of the rules governing the game. A plaintiff's effort to
recover under an intentional tort theory may also be thwarted by
defenses available to the defendant. 30 The most important defense
is the equitable theory volenti non fit injuria, or in English - to one
who is willing, no wrong is done.3 ' This maxim posits that an
athlete consents to any contact sustained as a result of his
participation in a lawful game or contest. 32 The consent defense is
deemed valid only with regard to those contacts that conform with
the sport's rules. 33 Consequently, intentional acts that are obvious
violations of game rules are not considered- consented to since they
are not the type of acts that the participant could legitimately expect
34
to encounter.
In suits brought by injured athletes against school
administrators, coaches, and officials for sports related injuries, the
intentional tort theory is seldom relied upon as a basis for liability.
These parties' primary liability exposure involves conduct that is
negligent. However, prior to considering the elements that
comprise a negligence claim in a sports case, it is important to
review a type of sports tort that falls somewhere between the
30. SeeG. SCHUBERT, R. SMITH &J. TRENTADUE, SPORTS LAw 5 7.41A] [9] (1986) [hereinafter
SCHUBERT]. The authors note that assumption of risk and consent are common defenses to an
intentional tort. Id. The authors contend that "[c]ourts may consider players, coaches, referees, and
anyone else who voluntarily participates in an athletic activity to have consented to and assumed the
risk of injuries normally associated with that sport." Id.
31. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, 5 18, at 112. The authors note that consent "is not,
strictly speaking, a privilege, or even a defense, but goes to negative the existence of any tort in the
first instance." Id. (footnotes omitted); see also 4 AM. JUR. 2D Amusements and Exhibitions § 86 (1962) (a
voluntary participant in a lawful game or contest is precluded from recovering from another
participant for injury since he has consented to the game and the incident assault).

32. See generally Comment, A ProposedLegislative Solution to the Problem of Violent Acts by Participants
During Professional Sporting Events: The Sports Violence Act of 1980, 7 U. DAYTON L. REV. 91, 95-97
(1981).
33. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 50 comment b (1965). The Second Restatement of

Torts formalizes the modern approach as follows:
Taking part in a game manifests a willingness to submit to such bodily contacts or
restrictions of liberty as are permitted by its rules or usages. Participating in such a
game does not manifest consent to contacts which are prohibited by rules or usages of
the game if such rules or usages are designed to protect the participants and not merely
to secure the better playing of the game as a test of skill. This is true although the
player knows that those with or against whom he is playing are habitual violators of
such rules.
Id.; Cf. Williams, Consent and Public Policy, 1962 CRIM. L. REV. 74, 81. Williams refers to contact
sports and states that "the consent by players to the use of moderate force is clearly valid, and the
players are even deemed to consent to an application of force that is in breach of the rules of the
game, if it is the sort of thing that may be expected to happen during the game." Id. at 81 (cited in
Comment, supra note 32, at 96-97 n.31).
34. See Comment, supra note 32. The commentator notes that "Ithe problem arises in
determining the scope of the actor's privilege, i.e. which acts are permissible as an inherent part of
the game and are thus 'privileged' batteries and which acts exceed the scope of the player's implied
consent and are thus 'unprivileged' batteries." Id. at 96.
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intentional tort and negligence. This tort is generally referred to as
"reckless misconduct."
B. RECKLESS MISCONDUCT
As previously mentioned, the intent element of an intentional
tort claim can be difficult to prove. For this reason, reckless
misconduct is often a more appropriate theory on which to base a
sports injury case. Recklessness is defined as conduct that a
reasonable person would understand as creating "an unreasonable
risk of physical harm to another. "5 The tort of reckless misconduct
has been adopted in cases involving injuries to both amateur and
36
professional athletes.
The reckless misconduct tort was applied to amateur sports in
Nabozny v. Barnhill.3s In Nabozny the goal tender of a high school
soccer team was seriously injured when the defendant kicked him in
the head. 38 The plaintiff had gone into a kneeling position inside
39
the penalty zone in order to receive a pass from his teammate.
Witnesses testified that the plaintiff was in possession of the ball
when the contact occurred. 40 Nabozny relied on the testimony of
expert witnesses to establish that under the applicable soccer rules,
all players are prohibited "from making contact with the
goalkeeper when he is in possession of the ball in the penalty
area. ''41

In reversing a directed verdit for the defendant, the Appellate
Court of Illinois determined that "a player is liable for injury in a
.35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Towrs 5 500 (1965).

36. See, e.g., Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 601 F.2d 516, 524 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 931 (1979) (claim for relief recognized for injury caused by reckless conduct of professional
lootball player); Nabozny v. Barnhill, 31 111. App. 3d 212, 215, 334 N.E.2d 258, 261 (1975) (liability
imposed for injury caused by defendant's reckless disregard for safety of other player); Bourque v.
Duplechin, 331 So. 2d 40, 43 (La. Ct. App. 1976) (recovery allowed for injuries received in softball

game caused by reckless conduct in running outside of basepath); Ross v. Clouser, 637 S.W.2d 11,
14 (Mo. 1982) (en banc) (a plaintiff may recover for injuries incurred in an athletic competition
caused by a player's reckless disregard for the safety of fellow participants); Kabella v. Bouschelle,
100 N.M. 461, __, 672 P.2d 290, 294 (Ct. App. 1983) (a claim for relief for injuries sustained by
athletic participants may be predicated upon reckless or intentional conduct).
37. 31 111.App. 3d 212, 334 N.E.2d 258 (1975).
38. Nabozny v. Barnhill, 31 Ill. App. 3d 212, 214, 334 N.E.2d 258, 260(1975).
39. Id. The plaintiff played the position of goaltender for one team and the defendant played
forward for the other team. Id. at 213. 334 N.E.2d at 259. The plaintiff went to his left knee, received
a pass, and pulled the ball to his chest. Id. at 214, 334 N.E.2d at 260. The defendant ran toward the
plaintiff and kicked him in the left side of the head. Id. As a result of the contact, the plaintiff suffered
permanent damage to his skull and brain. Id.
40. Id. All of the witnesses to the incident testified that the defendant had time to avoid contact
with the plaintiff.
41. Id. According to soccer rules, any contact with a goalkeeper in possession of the ball in the
penalty area is an infraction of the rules even if the contact is unintentional. Id. The court noted that
only shoulder to shoulder contact between players going for a ball is permitted in the sport of soccer.

Id.
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tort action if his conduct is such that it is either deliberate, willful or
with a reckless disregard for the safety of the other player so as to
cause injury to that player." ' 4 2 The court noted that it had some
reluctance in regulating athletic competition. 43 However, the court
reasoned that the alternative, allowing an innocent injured athlete
44
to go uncompensated, was unacceptable.
The reckless misconduct tort was extended to professional
sports in Hackbartv. CincinnatiBengaIs, Inc. 45 In Hackbart the plaintiff
was injured when Charles "Booby" Clark, a member of the
Cincinnati Bengals professional football team, hit him from
behind. 46 A penalty was not called because the officials had not
observed the incident. 47 Because Hackbart had not commenced the
lawsuit within the one year statute of limitations applicable to
intentional torts, the defendant contended that a claim based on
assault and battery was not available.48 Hackbart relied instead on
the argument that a Colorado statute providing for a six year
limitations period was applicable because the "injury was the result
of reckless disregard of the rights of the plaintiff." 4 9 The trial court
refused to apply the reckless misconduct theory to professional
50
football because football is a business that is violent in nature.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed,
42. Id. at 215, 334 N.E.2d at 261. The court determined that when athletes are engaged in an
athletic competition and safety rules have been promulgated that are primarily designed to protect
players from serious injury, "a player is then charged with a legal duty to every other player on the
field to refrain from conduct proscribed by a safety rule." Id. at 215, 334 N.E.2d at 260-61.
43. Id. at 215, 334 N.E.2d at 260. The court expressed its concern in regulating athletic
competition as follows:
This court believes that the law should not place unreasonable burdens on the free and
vigorous participation in sports by our youth. However, we also believe that
organized, athletic competition does not exist in a vacuum. Rather, some of the
restraints of civilization must accompany every athlete on to the playing field. One of
the educational benefits of organized athletic competition to our youth is the
development of discipline and self control.
Id.
44. Id. at 215, 334 N.E.2d at 261. The court stated that "reckless disregard for the safety of
other players cannot be excused." Id.
45. 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 931 (1979).
46. Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 601 F.2d 516, 519 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
931 (1979). After a pass play was over, the defendant struck the plaintiff in the back of the head with
sufficient force to cause both players to fall forward to the ground. Id. The defendant testified at trial
that he acted out of anger and frustration because his team was losing the game. Id. 47. Id. Although the officials did not view the incident, the game film clearly showed what had
occurred. Id.
48. Id. at 525.
49. Id.; see COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. 5 13-80-110 (1973) (6 year limitation for "actions on the
case"),
50. See Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 435 F. Supp. 352, 357 (D. Colo. 1977), rev'd, 601
F.2d 516 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 931 (1979). The trial court ruled as a matter of law that
even intentional injuries incurred in football games are outside the framework of the law. See id. at
358. The trial court noted that, despite the fact that the blow was intentional, the game of
professional football is a violent business and the proper sanctions for such conduct are imposition of
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and upheld Hackbart's reckless misconduct claim on the ground
that Colorado recognized the action of reckless disregard for the
safety of others.5 1 By recognizing an action for reckless misconduct,
the court in Hackbart essentially applied the reasoning of Nabozny to
professional sports.
C.

NEGLIGENCE

A plaintiff must prove the following elements in order to
establish a negligence claim: (1) The defendant owed a duty to
conform to a standard of conduct established by law for the
protection of the plaintiff; (2) the defendant breached that duty; (3)
the defendant's breach was the legal cause of the plaintiffs injury;
and (4) the plaintiff suffered a compensable injury. 52 Thus, the first
inquiry in a negligence case is whether the defendant owed a duty
of care to the particular plaintiff.5 3
1. Duty of Care Owed to an Athlete
In evaluating the duty of care that is owed to an athlete, it is
important to carefully analyze the relationship between the injured
plaintiff athlete and the individual who was allegedly negligent.
The duty of care that is owed to an athlete is different for a school
administrator than for a coach or for a sports official. This is due to
the role that each of these various parties plays in administering
secondary school sports.
a) Duty Based on Relationship
The common law recognized that someone may owe a duty to
control the conduct of another person based on the relationship
penalties and expulsion from the game. See id. at 353, 354. In addition, the trial court noted that
incidents of this nature are not unusual in contact sports. See id. at 356.
51. Hackbart, 601 F.2d at 525. The court concluded that if the evidence established that the
injuries were the result of actions on the part of Clark that were in reckless disregard of the safety of
the plaintiff, the plaintiff had established a cause of action subject to the six year Colorado statute of
limitations. Id.; see COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. S 13-80-110 (1973) (6 year limitations period for "actions
on the case").
52. RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF TORTS S 328A (1965). Negligence includes situations in which a
person acts affirmatively and his conduct falls below the accepted standard, as well as when a person
fails to act when a duty to act is owed. Id. § 282 comment a; see also PRossER & KEETON, supra note 13,
S30, at 164-65 (discussing the elements of negligence).
53. See W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE.LAW OF TORTS S 53 (4th ed. 1971). Prosser contends that
the issue of duty requires a determination of whether the defendant is under any obligation for the
benefit of the particular plaintiff. Id. 5 53, at 324. If a duty is owed, the defendant must conform to
the standard of reasonable conduct in light of the apparent risk. Id.
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between the two parties. 54 This affirmative obligation to control
was initially limited to certain relationships.5 5 Supporting this
limited application was the argument that in some relationships,
one of the parties is in a unique position to control the other party,
and therefore owes a duty to exercise his special skill or judgment in
an effort to protect third parties. 56 Courts have determined that the
duty to control applies to the relationship between employer and
employee, 57 and between parent and child. 58 Because the law vests
in the dominant figures the right to control, it also imposes the
obligation that such control will be affirmatively exercised in a
manner that minimizes harm to others.5 9 Innocent third parties
have a right to expect that they will not be harmed by the failure of
the dominant figures to assume their control obligation, and if this
duty is breached an innocent third party has a viable negligence
action.
60
Coaches may owe a duty to control participant athletes.
Coaches who fail to instruct their players about techniques that
minimize the risk of injury to others may be open to a negligence
claim when a player injures another participant. 6' In addition to
controlling the athletes under his or her supervision, a coach may
owe a duty to those athletes to take steps to protect them from
harm. 62 Coaching activities that probably fall within the duty of
care include: (1) properly supervising athletes and assistants to
insure adequate protection against accident or injury; 63 (2)

54. RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs S 315(a) (1965). Seegenerally Harper & Kime, The Duty to
Control the Conduct ofAnother, 43 YAL LJ. 886 (1934).
55. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 316 (1965) (parent must control child); id. § 317
(master must control servant); id. S 318 (possessor must control licensee); id. S 319 (voluntary
guardian must control dangerous ward).
56. See id. 55 316-19; james, Scope of Duly in Negligence Cases, 47 Nw. U.L. REV. 778, 810-13
(1953) (discussing the ability to control another in certain relationships).
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oF TowS 5 317 (1965).
58. eeid. 5316.
59. SeeJames, supra note 56.
60. See, e.g., Stehn v. Bernarr MacFadden Found Inc., 434 F.2d 811, 815 (6th Cir. 1970) (coach
held liable for injuries resulting from his failure to properly instruct wrestlers about certain holds that
presented danger of physical injury to the opponent).
61. See id.
62. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S314A comment b (1965) (relationship of dependence
may create obligation on dominant party to protect weaker party).
63. See, e.g., Dailey v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., 2 Cal. 3d 741, 750, 470 P.2d 360, 365,
87 Cal. Rptr. 376, 381 (1970) (lack of supervision may have been proximate cause of injury to
student); see also SCHUBaET, supra note 30, 5 7.4[A11. The authors contend that the primary
responsibility of a coach or athletic instructor is the duty to supervise and warn athletes and to
supervise and instruct assistants. id. The authors also note that "[cloaches and instructors must
exercise reasonable supervision over their pupils commensurate with the age and experience of the
students and the nature of the activity." Id. 5 7.4 IA][51. Furthermore, additional supervision is
required if the student engages in an activity that is likely to produce an injury or if the student will
come in contact with an inherently dangerous object. See id. 5 7.41A1141.
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properly instructing athletes concerning game rules; 64 (3) taking
appropriate action when a participant is injured; 6 5 and (4) insuring
that environmental considerations do not pose a threat of injury to
66
participating athletes.
The sports official is charged with the responsibility of insuring
that the game is played in accordance with the rules, and
consequently owes an obligation to all participants to control onthe-field conduct appropriately. 67 It is the referee's willing
acceptance of the responsibility for proper supervision that creates a
duty of care owed to the athlete. 68 Thus, failure to properly control
69
the game may lead to negligence liability.
As mentioned previously, school districts and administrators
may be vicariously liable for the negligent acts of their employees,

64. See J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, THE. LAW OF SPORTS S 8.06 (1st ed. 1979) [hereinafter
WRISTART & LOWELL]. The authors state that when a coach, or a person under his direction, does not
conduct training, instruction, and practice in such a way that minimizes the risk of injury, the coach
will be liable for the injuries caused. Id. S 8.06, at 981; see also SCHUBERT, supra note 30, S 7.4[A][2]
(duty to instruct includes teaching the fundamentals of the game and conditioning, and it is the
coach's duty to minimize serious sports related injuries).
65. See, e.g., Mogabgab v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 239 So. 2d 456, 460-61 (La. Ct. App.
1970) (high school football coach was negligent for failing to provide medical treatment for over two
hours to an athlete who collapsed and later died of heat stroke); Morris v. Union High School Dist.
A., 160 Wash. 121, 294 P. 998, 999 (1931) (coach was negligent for permitting, persuading, and
coercing a player to compete when coach knew, or should have known, that player was already
suffering from serious injuries to his back and spine); see also SCHUBERT, supra note 30, 5 7.4[A][6].
The authors contend that a coach may be liable for failing to provide prompt medical assistance to an
injured athlete, for injuries caused by moving an injuried athlete, for providing medical treatment in
a negligent manner, or for permitting or requiring an athlete to compete while injured. Id.
66. See, e.g., Everett v. Bucky Warren, Inc., 376 Mass. 280, -,
380 N.E.2d 653, 659 (1978)
(if a coach is given the responsibility of selecting the equipment to be purchased, he must use more
than ordinary care to choose equipment not unsafe for its intended use); Domino v. Mercurio, 17
A.D.2d 342, -,
234 N.Y.S.2d 1011, 1013 (1962), aff'd, 13 N.Y.2d 922, 193 N.E.2d 893, 244
N.Y.S.2d 69 (1963) (school district may be liable for negligence of coach that allowed spectators to
pose a danger to the players by congregating close to the playing field); Brooks v. Board of Educ., 29
Misc. 2d 19, -,
205 N.Y.S.2d 777, 779-80 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960), aft'd, 15 A.D.2d 495, 222
N.Y.S.2d 184 (1961) (physical education instructor negligent for mismatching participants by height
and weight in a hazardous soccer activity); see also SCHUBERT, supra note 30, S 7.4[A][8][b]. The
authors note that a coach may be liable for unsafe playing conditions if he or she is aware or should
have been aware of the danger and failed to warn others. Id. In addition, a coach must use reasonable
care in inspecting facilities for hidden dangers, and "may have an obligation to refuse to proceed
with the event if the facilities are so inadequate that they pose an unreasonable risk of serious injury
to the participants." Id.
67. See SCHUBERT, supra note 30, S 7.5. The authors state that although a referee cannot prevent
all violations of the rules, he or she must use reasonable care to detect and penalize infractions of the
rules. Id. Additionally, the official's responsibility is broader than enforcement of rules, and includes
the duty to anticipate reasonably foreseeable dangers and take reasonable precautions to protect
participants and spectators from harm. Id.
68. The supervisory authority of a referee may be analogized to the duty to control the conduct
of another. See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text. In addition, this authority creates a duty to
protect the players within the referee's "custody." See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 314A
comment b (1965) (relationship of dependence may create obligation on dominant party to protect
weaker party).
69. See SCHUBERT, supra note 30, S 7.5; see also Carabba v. Anacortes School Dist. No. 103, 72
Wash. 2d 939,
-, 435 P.2d 936, 948 (1967) (referee can be found negligent for failing to detect the
use of an illegal wrestling hold).
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such as coaches. 70 In addition, they are directly responsible for
certain functions within a sports program. 7 1 Provision for adequate
and timely medical services, and selection of competent coaches are
72
among the responsibilities assumed by the school administration.
Assumption of these duties gives rise to a duty of care owed to
athletes and creates the possibility of a negligence lawsuit.
b) Contractual Duty
A duty of care may also arise from a contractual relationship.
This theory of recovery is most applicable to coaches and game
officials, since both of these parties have entered into contracts
prior to performing their respective duties. The coach's contract is
with the school district. The official may have signed a contract to
work the game through a booking agent, or in some cases, directly
with the school. In either case, the existence of the contract creates
certain obligations that the parties must perform in a satisfactory
manner to avoid negligence liability.
A coach or official who acts carelessly is clearly violating the
contract that he or she signed, since it is inherent in the agreement
that these parties will use certain skill and knowledge in performing
their duties. The question that arises from this contractual
relationship is whether the injured athlete can rely on the contract
to establish a duty of care in tort law. 73 Since contracts are regarded
as personal to those individuals who have entered into them, the
general rule of "privity of contract" denied third persons the right
70. For a discussion of a school district's vicarious liability, see supra notes 1-11 and
accompanying text.
71. See WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 64, 5 8.05. Weistart and Lowell describe the duty that
educational institutions owe to students participating in athletic events as follows:
With respect to the athletic activities conducted under their auspices, educational
institutions have the duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent reasonably foreseeable
risks and, where such risks are foreseen, to take sufficient precautions to protect the
students in their custody. This general duty can be translated into several specific
obligations. Thus, the institution may be required to establish, and enforce, rules for
the maintenance of discipline in sports and recreational activities (though they need
not cover every possibility presented by the boundless natural instincts of children for
self-amusement); provide adequate supervision for the sports or recreational activities
held under their auspices and exercise due care in the selection of supervisors; and
provide suitable equipment and facilities for the conduct of sports and recreational
activities.
Id. 5 8.05, at 971 (footnotes omitted).
72. For a general discussion of school district and administrator responsibilities, see infra notes
127-58 and accompanying text.
73. See PRossER & KEETON, supra note 13, S 93. Prosser and Keeton note that "by entering into a
contract with A, the defendant may place himself in such a relation toward B that the law will impose
upon him an obligation, sounding in tort and not contract, to act in such a way that B will not be
injured." Id. § 93, at 667-68.
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to sue on a contract to which they were not a party. 74 This concept
was based on the reasoning that, since there was no logical
connection between the contract and third parties, no duty of care
was created. 75 This general common-law approach was responsible
for many harsh decisions in contract law, particularly with respect
76
to injuries caused by defective products.
Gradually, tort law began to recognize that innocent third
parties, who rely on a contract to which they are not a party,ought
to be able to sue for negligence if injured by tortious conduct. 77 In
the sports law context, an argument can be made that a referee
enters into a contract to provide services that will benefit the
athletes, thereby giving rise to a tort duty of care. 78 Sports
participants have a right to expect that an official will perform his
or her duties in a nonnegligent fashion, and when this is not done,
the injured athlete may rely upon the employment contract to
establish a tort claim. Likewise, a coach's contract could be viewed
as creating a similar duty of care that is owed to an athlete.
"c) Statutory Duty
It is also possible that a duty of care may be created by statute
or league rule. 79 Violation of a game or league rule may constitute
74. See Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879). In Ward the United States Supreme Court
described the concept of privity of contract as follows:
Where the wrongful. act is not immediately dangerous to the lives of others, the
negligent party, unless he is a public agent in the performance of some duty, is in
general liable only to the party with whom he contracted, and on the ground that
negligence is in breach of the contract.

Id. at 204; see also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, 5 93.
75. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, S 93, at 667.
76. See id. 5 96. Early cases employing the general rule of privity of contract allowed
manufacturers to escape liability to an injured consumer on the theory that there was no privity of
contract between the manufacturer and the purchaser. Id. at 681-82; see, e.g., Lebourdais v. Vitrified
Wheel Co., 194 Mass. 341, -,
80 N.E. 482, 482 (1907) (manufacturer of defective goods is
generally not liable to those with whom he shared no contractual relationship). The consumer's only
remedy was against the dealer that sold him the defective product, and this was invariably an
inadequate solution since the assets available for recovery of a judgment were usually limited.
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, 5 96.
77. See, e.g., Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922). In Glanzer the purchaser
was allowed to recover on a tort theory from a public weigher who certified an incorrect weight to the
seller. Id. at -. , 135 N.E. at 277. A number of states, however, have refused to follow Glanzer. See,
e.g., Norwood v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 74 F. Supp. 483, 485 (E.D.S.C. 1947) (breach of an
agent's duty to his principle will not support a third party's claim); Zamecki v. Hartford Accident &
Ind. Co., 202 Md. 54, -,
95 A.2d 302, 306 (1953) (insurance contract will not support direct
action against insurance company); Miller v. Davis & Averill, Inc., 137 N.J.L. 671, -,
61 A.2d
253, 255 (1948) (one who is not a party to a contract cannot sue for breach of duty arising out of the
contract).
78. Cf Roscoe Moss Co. v. Jenkins, 55 Cal. App. 2d 369, -,
130 P.2d 477, 481 (1942) (a
duty of care is imposed on contracting parties who undertake professional engagements requiring the
exercise of care, skill, and knowledge and is implied by law).
79. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, § 36, at 220.
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negligence or reckless disregard for the safety of others if that rule is
designed to protect participants from serious injury. 0 In Nabozny v.
Barnhill 81 the court relied upon the defendant's violation of a
league soccer rule against making contact with a goaltender as the
basis for an injured player's recovery against the player who
injured him.8 2 Since the rule clearly established the appropriate
standard of care, the defendant's conduct in violating the safety
rule constituted a breach of his legal duty.8 3 When a statute
provides the level of conduct required by law, failure to abide by
the statutory standard of care constitutes either evidence of
negligence or negligence per se. 8 4 Consequently, if a statute
requires that coaches or team trainers undergo certain paramedical
training, and a player's injuries are rendered more severe because
the attending party did not receive the required instruction, this
80. See, e..k., Peterson v. Mult-County School Dist. No. I, 64 Or. App. 81,
-_, 668 P.2d 385,
393-94 (1983) (private organization was negligent for failing to require or recommend that member
schools follow preseason contact scrimmage safety recommendations of national high school
association); see also Kabella v. Bouschelle, 100 N.M. 461, 672 P.2d 290 (1983). In Kabella the court
determined that participation in a game involving bodily contact does not constitute consent to
contacts prohibited by the rules of the sport if the rules were designed for the protection of the
p~articipants. Id. at -,
672 P.2d at 293-94. The court noted, however, that a claim for relief for
personal injuries during an athletic game must be predicated on intentional or reckless conduct, not
mere negligence. Id. at -,
672 P.2d at 294; accord Oswald v. Township High School Dist. No.
214, 84 Ill. App. 3d 723, ___ 406 N.E.2d 157, 159-60 (1983) (complaint alleging negligence for
violation of National Federation of High School Association rules failed to state a claim for relief
absent a showing of reckless or intentional conduct).
81.31 I1. App. 3d 212, 334 N.E.2d 258(1975).
82. Nabozny v. Barnhill, 31 Il1. App. 3d 212, 215. 334 N.E.2d 258, 260-61 (1975).
83. See id. The court in Nabozny described the consequences ofviolatinga safety rule designed to
protect players from serious injury as follows:

ITjhis

court believes that when athletes are engaged in an athletic competition; all
teams involved are trained and coached by knowledgeable personnel; a recognized set
of rules governs the conduct of the competition; and a safety rule is contained therein
which is primarily designed to protect players from serious injury, a player is then charged
with a Leal duty to every other plqyer on the field to refrain from conduct proscribed by a sqfety rule.
A reckless disregard for the safety of other players cannot be excused. To engage in
such conduct is to create an intolerable and unreasonable risk of serious injury to other
participants.... The defendant contends he is immune from tort action for any injury
to another player that happens during the course of a game, to which theory we do not
subscribe.
Id. (emphasis added).
84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965). Section 286 of the Second Restatement of
Torts provides:
The court may adopt as the standard ofconduct of a reasonable man the requirements
ofa legislative enactment or an administrative regulation whose purpose is found to be
exclusively or in part
(a) to protect a class of persons which includes the one whose interest is invaded, and
(b) to protect the particular interest which is invaded, and
(c) to protect that interest against the kind of harm which has resulted, and
(d) to protect that interest against the particular hazard from which the harm results.
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arguably would constitute negligence as a matter of law. 8 5
In every state a regulatory body exists that issues rules and
regulations that have a direct impact on the administration of
athletics. 8 6 These bodies determine the qualifications and duties of
officials, coaches, administrators, and school districts. 87 Arguably
these duties establish a standard of conduct for each of these
parties. Thus, violation of these regulations may constitute
negligence. In North Dakota this regulatory body is the North
88
Dakota High School Activities Association.
2. Breaching the Duty of Care
In order to recover under a negligence claim, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the duty of care owed by the defendant was
breached. 89 In deciding this question, the defendant's conduct is
evaluated in accordance with the judgment and skill that a
reasonable person in the same or similar circumstances would have
exercised. 90 A person possessing certain skill or expertise in a
particular area, such as a referee, is required to act with a standard
of special knowledge and ability in conformance with how a
reasonable, prudent person with such skills would have acted in the
same situation. 9 As a result, when an official allows a game to be
played during a thunderstorm and an athlete is injured by
lightning, a court could hold that the referee violated the duty of
care owed to the athletes. Likewise, courts may view the failure to
enforce required equipment rules, the failure to penalize prohibited
conduct, and the failure to provide proper supervision of medical
85. See id. The By-Laws of the NDHSAA require that all secondary sc hool athletes receive a
physical prior to participating in interscholastic sports. N.D.H.S.A.A. By-Laws art. XI § 1. Failure
ol'a coach or school administrator to require an athlete to undergo such an examination would be an
example of conduct that may constitute negligence per se. Cf. SCHUBERT, supra note 30, 5
7.2lAIl[lal . The authors contend that "lain unexcnsed violation of a law or governmental
regulation defining conduct is considered negligence per se." Id. The authors similarly argue that
"IN,'iolating a club or league rule may likewise constitute negligence if that rule is recognized.by the
court as establishing the standard of care required for the protection of others. Even when a court
refuses to adopt a rule or regulation as the standard of care required of the reasonable person,
violation of that rule may nevertheless be evidence of negligence." Id. (citation omitted).
86. See, e.g., N.D.H.S.A.A. CONST. art. II (stating that one purpose of the North Dakota High
School Activities Association is to administer interschool activities).
87. See, e.g, N.D.H.S.A.A. BY-LAws art. IX; id. art. X.
88. See supra notes 86-87.
89. Sfe PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, S 30, at 164-65; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS S 328A (1965).
90. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, § 32, at 175.
91. See id. Prosser and Keeton contend that if a person has knowledge, skill, or intelligence
superior to that of the ordinary person, the law will demand that the person's conduct conform with
his special attributes. id.; see also Carabba v. Anacortes School Dist. No. 103, 72 Wash. 939,
435 P.2d 936, 938 (1967) (standard of care applicable to a referee is that of an ordinary, prudent
referee).
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assistance as a breach of the official's duty of' care owed to an
athlete.
3. Causation
When a duty of care has been established, along with a breach
of that duty, the plaintiff athlete must also prove that the claimed
negligent act was both the actual and proximate cause of his
injuries. 92 Actual cause, often referred to as "'cause in fact," is a
question of fact determined by the jury, or by the judge in nonjury
trials. When the plaintiff athlete can prove that he would not have
suffered injury "but for" the defendant tortfeasor's conduct, the
actual causation element is proved. 93 A referee or coach may be the
actual cause of a participant athlete's injury by virtue of' either
having failed to act, or by having acted improperly. When a
referee's failure to enforce game rules results in a physical injury,
the "but for" test is satisfied.
Proof of actual causation, however, is insufficient to hold an
individual liable for negligence. The plaintiff must also
demonstrate that the tortfeasor's actions were the legal, or
proximate, cause of the injuries. The purpose of the proximate
cause requirement is to place a limit on the extent to which a
tortfeasor is responsible for his or her acts. 94 The test for proximate
cause requires a determination of whether the defendant's conduct
was a "substantial factor in bringing about the harm. "9
4. Compensable Injurv
The final element in a negligence claim is the existence of' a
legally compensable injury.9 6 This injury may consist of death or
physical harm. 97 In addition, damage to the plaintiff's property or
economic interests may be remedied in a negligence action. 98 For
92. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, S 41 (actual cause): id. S42 (proximate cause).
93. Id. § 41,at 266.
94. Id. § 41, at 264. The authors state as follows:

As a practical matter, legal responsibility must be limited to those causes which are so
closely connected with the result and of such significance that the law is justified in
imposing liability. Some boundary must be set to liability for the consequences of any

act, upon the basis ofsone social idea of justice or policy.
Id.
95. R.srATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965).
96. Id. S 328A.
97. SCHtUBERT. supra note 30, § 7.2, at 183-84.

98. Id. at 184.
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purposes of this Article, only cases involving physical injury or
death are discussed.
5. Defenses to a Negligence Claim
The common law recognized the right of a defendant to avoid
liability for negligence if the defendant could demonstrate that the
plaintiff was contributorily negligent. 99 Under this doctrine, an
injured athlete is not permitted to recover against a negligent
official or coach if the defendant proves contributory negligence by
the plaintiff.10 0 For example, when a coach has instructed a football
player not to make initial contact with the helmet, and the player
fails to heed his coach's instruction, the player arguably must bear
the responsibility for any injuries received.
The contributory negligence doctrine often causes hardship to
a plaintiff by completely barring recovery, even when the
defendant's negligence was much greater than the plaintiff's.' 0 t
Consequently, most states have adopted the doctrine of
comparative negligence. 10 2 In these states, a plaintiff who was
contributorily negligent is not barred from recovering against the
defendant, but the amount recovered is reduced in proportion to
03
his or her own fault in causing the injury.
Another defense available to a sports negligence defendant is
"assumption of risk.'' 1 0 4 Under this doctrine, a plaintiff who
voluntarily participates in an activity, knowing the inherent risks,
cannot recover for injuries resulting from those risks. 105 Participant
athletes necessarily assume risks that are an inherent part of the
game. In Vendrell v. School District No. 26C 106 a football player
suffered permanent damage to his neck and spinal cord when he
lowered his head in order to ward off potential tacklers. 0 7 At trial,
testimony was introduced to demonstrate that the coach had
99. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, 5 65. Contributory negligence is conduct of the
plaintiff that contributes to the harm the plaintiff has suffered and that falls below the standard of
conduct to which the plaintiff is required to conform for his own protection. Id. 5 65, at 451.
100. See WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 64, S 8.02, at 934-35 (discussion of defense of
contributory negligence in sports law cases).
101. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, S 67.
102. Id.
103. Id. Most comparative negligence jurisdictions bar a plaintiffs recovery if his or her
negligence exceeds a certain percentage of fault, typically 49 or 50%. Id.
104. See WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 64, S 8.02 (discussion of assumption of risk defense that
precludes recovery by an injured athlete in sports cases).
105. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 496A & comment c (1965).
106. 233 Or. 1,376 P.2d 406 (1962).
107. Vendrell v. School Dist. No. 26C, 231 Or. 1, -, 376 P.2d 406, 409 (1962). The plaintiff
alleged that he had not received proper instructions or equipment from his coaches. Id. at __, 376
P.2d at 408.
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properly instructed the player not to use the helmet as an offensive
weapon. 10 The court noted that the contact element of football was
an inherent and ordinary risk assumed by all participants. 10 9 The
court held that the plaintiff assumed the risk of injuries caused by
the tackle because the plaintiff was a voluntary participant and the
tackle that caused the injury was made according to the rules of the
game. 110

However, when a court finds that the conduct causing the
injury falls outside what is ordinarily encountered in a sport, the
court may deem the conduct unreasonable and may conclude that
the participant did not assume the risk of injury."' For example,
courts have held that players injured by gross violations of the game
rules did not assume the risk of injury from these violations." 2
Similarly, negligent conduct by third persons is not considered
within the risks assumed by the players." 3 Thus, athletes have been
108. Id. at __
, 376 P.2d at 413. The defendant introduced evidence demonstrating that every
player was properly instructed on how to run with the ball, how to tackle an opposing player, and
how to reduce or minimize injury if tackled. Id.
109. Id. at __
, 376 P.2d at 412-13. The court stated the reasons for the general rule that a
participant cannot recover for injuries sustained in a contact athletic event as follows:
The playing of football is a body-contact sport. The game demands that the players
come into physical contact with each other constantly, frequently with great force. The
lineman charge the opposing line vigorously, shoulder to shoulder. The tackler faces
the risk of leaping at the swiftly moving legs of the ball-carrier and the latter must be
prepared to strike the ground violently. Body contacts, bruises, and clashes are
inherent in the game. There is no other way to play it. No prospective player need be
told that a participant in the game of football may sustain injury. The fact is self
evident. It draws to the game the manly; they accept its risks, blows, clashes and
injuries without whimper ....
IThel plaintiff assumed the risk attendant upon being
tackled. The risk of injury that was inherent in being tackled was obvious. The
plaintiff was thoroughly familiar with it. He had been tackled scores of times and had
been the tackler many many times. The tackle in question was made fairly and
according to the rules.
Id. at 412-14.
110. Id. at __
, 376 P.2d at 414. The court determined that "Itlhc risk of injury that was
inherent in being tackled was obvious." Id.
I . WEISTART & LoWELl., supra note 64, S8.02, at 942.
112. See Bourque v. Duplechin, 331 So. 2d 40 (La. Ct. App. 1976). Bourque involved injuries
arising out of a collision between two baseball players. See id. at 41-42. Bourque, who was playing
shortstop, fielded a batted ball and was attempting to effect a double play. Id. at 41. After making the
throw to first base, Bourque, who was standing five feet outside the baseline, was hit by Duplechin.
Id. On impact Duplechin raised his forearm and delivered a blow to Bourque's head. Id. Duplechin
argued that Bourque had assumed the risk of such contact by participating in the softball game. Id.
The court rejected this argument, stating:
Bourque did not assume the risk of Duplechin going out of his way to run into him at
full speed when Bourque was five feet away from the base. A participant in a game or
sport assumes all of the risks incidental to that particular activity which are obvious
and foreseeable. A participant does not assume the risk of injury from fellow players
acting in an unexpected or unsportsmanlike way with a reckless lack of concern for
others participating.
Id. at 42.

113.

WlS'rART & LOWELL.,

supra note 64, S 8.02, at 944.
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allowed to recover for negligent conduct by coaches and referees.'

III. LIABILITY FOR SECONDARY SCHOOL
INJURIES - A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

SPORTS

A. DOCTRINE OF Respondeat Superior
As previously mentioned, under the doctrine of respondeat
superior courts impose vicarious liability on an employer for the
tortious acts of an employee, if the employee was acting within the
scope of his or her employment.1 1 5 In effect, the injured third
person may bring a legal action against either the employer or the
employee, or both simultaneously, since the employer and
employee are jointly and severally liable."16
In analyzing whether an employee has acted within the scope
of employment, courts consider a number of factors. The
employee's conduct is evaluated to determine whether it was of the
type that the employee was hired to do. 1 7 Whether the employer
had reason to expect that the agent would commit such an act and
whether the employer furnished the means by which the employee
accomplished the act are additional considerations." 8 Courts also
evaluate the act to determine whether it occurred within the time
and space limitations of the employment relationship." 9 Courts'
have adopted a liberal interpretation of the elements that are
necessary to prove that an employee acted within the scope of
employment. This view is premised on the policy argument that
injured third persons should not be denied the right to proceed
against the employer, since the employer is generally in a better
position to compensate the loss.1 20 Moreover, an employer is said to
incur liability in exchange for his or her ability to control employees
2
in the workplace. '
In sports cases, the concept of respondeat superior is extremely
important because the negligent conduct of an official or coach may
be imputed to the school district. 22 The application of the doctrine,
114. Id. For a discussion of cases involving negligence by coaches and referees, see supra notes
60-69 and accompanying text, and infra notes 159-87 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
116. SCHUBERT, supra note 30, S 7.2, at 203. Under the doctrine of joint and several liability,
each defendant is responsible for the total damage award. SeeW. SELL, AGENCY S 94, at 83 (1975).
117. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY S 228(1958).
118. Id. "S229.
119. See id. SS 233-34.
120. SeeW. SELL, AGENCY S95, at 84(1975).
121. Id.
122. See, e.g., Larson v. Independent School Dist. No. 314, 289 N.W.2d 112, 123 & n.20
(Minn. 1980) (school district vicariously liable for the negligence of physical education teacher and
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however, is subject to one very important exception - sovereign
immunity. Under the traditional formulation of the doctrine of
23
sovereign immunity, a state may not be sued without its consent.
Sovereign immunity extends to public schools and school
administrators. 124 Since the sovereign immunity doctrine has come
under tremendous criticism in recenty years, most states have
passed statutes that permit lawsuits against the state.' 25 It must be
noted, though, that in jurisdictions in which the concept is still in
effect, any lawsuit filed by an injured public school athlete against a
1 26
school district may be summarily dismissed.
B.

LIABILITY OF SCHOOL DISTRICTS AND ADMINISTRATORS

In jurisdictions where school districts and administrators are
not protected by sovereign immunity, they may be responsible for
athletic injuries that are reasonably foreseeable and are caused by a
27
failure to exercise an acceptable level of care to prevent injuries.1
for principal's negligent supervision of coach); Carabba v. Anacotes School Dist. No. 103, 72
435 P.2d 936, 948 (1967) (school district may be liable for injuries sustained by
Wash. 2d 939, -,
participant in high school wrestling match due to negligent supervision of the referee); see also
SCHUBERT, supra note 30, S 7.2[D]. The authors contend that a high school coach would "be an agent
of the school athletic director, school principal, district superintendent, school board, school district,
and city that operates the school system, and all of these principals might be sued for the coach's
negligent acts." Id. at 203; cf WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 64, 5 8.05, at 974 (school is
vicariously liable for the negligence of a teacher).
123. See generally WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 64, S 8.18, at 1030-31 (sovereign immunity
cloaks the actions of all public bodies considered to be instrumentalities of the state, including school
districts, school boards, or other authorities operating public schools).
124. See id. In contrast to the immunity of public schools, immunity has been held not to apply
to other parties involved in athletics. See, e.g., Coughlon v. Iowa High School Athletic Ass'n, 260
Iowa 702, -_, 150 N.W. 2d 660, 663 (1967) (state high school athletic association was not immune
from suit for damages allegedly suffered when bleachers collapsed at basketball tournament); Short
255 S.E.2d 479, 481 (1979) (immunity not granted to high school
v. Griffits, 220 Va. 53, -,
athletic director and coach for suit brought by injured participant); WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note
64, S 8.18, at 1031 (sovereign immunity even in its pure form will not cloak all entities formed to
govern the athletic activities of public institutions).
125. Seegenerall, PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, S 131, at 1044-46 (general discussion of the
abolition of sovereign immunity). For a discussion of immunity of governmental and charitable
institutions involving sports liability cases, see WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 64, S 8.18.
126. See, e.g., Hutt v. Etowah County Bd. of Educ., 454 So. 2d 973, 974 (Ala. 1984) (due to
sovereign immunity, county board of education was not subject to tort action for failing to furnish
safe gymnasium facilities at high school); Kain v. Rockridge Community Unit School Dist. No. 300,
453 N.E.2d 118, 120 (1983) (statute conferring immunity on coaches and
117 I11.
App. 3d 681, __,
school districts from negligence in the supervision of activities was applicable when school district
and coach allegedly violated a high school association rule prohibiting students from playing football
without adequate practice).
110 P.2d 1044, 1048
127. See, e.g., Taylor v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 17 Cal. 2d 594, __,
(1941) (the negligence of school authorities is established if a reasonably prudent person would
foresee that injuries of that type would likely happen in the absence of additional safeguards);
Charonnat v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 56 Cal. App. 2d 840, ___, 133 P.2d 643, 645
(1943) (the law imposes a duty on school authorities to provide sufficient supervision in school yards
so that fighting among children may be stopped before serious injury occurs); Cambareri v. Board of
Educ., 246 App. Div. 127, __, 284 N.Y.S. 892, 894 (1936), aff'd, 283 N.Y. 741, 28 N.E.2d 968
(1940) (standard of care of school administrator requires a consideration of whether a reasonably
prudent person would have anticipated the possibility of serious injury to participants); Carabba v.

1986]

SPORTS LIABILITY.,

475

School administrators have a duty to exercise reasonable care in
making decisions that may result in the creation of a foreseeable
risk of injury to a student athlete. 12 8 Courts have construed this
duty to include a school's responsibility to formulate and enforce
rules of conduct to which student athletes must adhere. 129 In
addition, educational institutions have an obligation to exercise due
care in selecting individuals that will supervise athletic activity; this
duty applies to both interscholastic and noninterscholastic sports. 130
Anacortes School Dist. No. 103, 72 Wash. 2d 939, -,
435 P.2d 936, 946 (1967) (a child may sue a
school district for injuries resulting from breach of its duty to protect the child from reasonably
foreseeable dangers); see also Reynolds v. State, 207 Misc. 963, 141 N.Y.S.2d 615 (N.Y. Ct. Cl.
1955). In Reynolds the court stated the duty of school districts and administrators to prevent injury as
follows:
(An] instructor, supervisor or teacher has the duty of reasonable care in the prevention

of injury, and must use the judgment of a qualified prudent person under similar
circumstances. The question is resolved into whether such supervisor, as a reasonably
prudent man before the occurrence of the accident had been apprehensive that, in the
situation presented, there lurked the possibility of serious injury to anyone

participating in the exercise.
Id. at-.,

141 N.Y.S.2d at 618.

128. See WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 64, S 8.05, at 971.
129. See, e.g., Tashjian v. North Cent. School Dist. No. 5, 50 A.D.2d 691,
-, 375 N.Y.S.2d
467, 468 (1975) (failure of school district to enforce its own rule requiring that third graders not be
allowed to participate in softball games justified finding of negligence); Germond v. Board of Educ.
of Cent. Dist. No. 1, 10 A.D.2d 139, -,
197 N.Y.S.2d 548, 550 (1960) (school board had
statutory duty to promulgate and enforce adequate safety rules for games conducted on playground);
Garber v. Central School Dist. No. 1, 251 A.D. 214,
-, 295 N.Y.S. 850, 856 (1937) (board of
education had duty to establish and enforce rules and regulations governing athletic activities); see
also WE!START & LOWELL, supra note 64, 5 8.05, at 971 (educational institution may have duty to
establish and enforce rules designed for discipline in athletic activities); cf Peterson v. Multnomah
County School Dist. No. 1, 64 Or. App. 81, -,
668 P.2d 385, 391 (1983) (private organization
could be held liable for failing to require, recommend, or at least inform member schools about safety
recommendations of national high school athletic association).
130. See, e.g., Lynch v. Board of Educ., 72 Ill. App. 3d 317, 323, 390 N.E.2d 526, 531 (1979)
(school district may be liable for failure to provide proper supervision in connection with a "powder
puff" football game); Brahatcek v. Millard School Dist. No. 17, 202 Neb. 86, -,
273 N.W.2d
680, 687 (1979) (school district liable for death of student struck by golf club as a result of lack of
supervision by instructor); Brittan v. State, 200 Misc. 743, -,
103 N.Y.S.2d 485, 488 (N.Y. Ct.
Cl. 1951) (allowing physical education class to be conducted by a nonqualified student instructor
constitutes negligence); Rodriguez v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 66 Wash. 2d 51, __,
401 P.2d
326, 327 (1965) ("school district may be liable for injuries sustained as a result of negligent
supervision or failure to supervise activities of its students"); see also WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note
64, 5 8.05. Weistart and Lowell describe the duty of educational institutions and the consequences of
the breach of that duty as follows:
Where educational institutions are charged with responsibility for their
employees' actions, their duty toward their students is somewhat altered. They still
have the duty to exercise due care to protect the students from unreasonable risks and
dangers, but this duty will not be fulfilled simply by the use of reasonable care in
delegating its performance to others. Rather, it will be satisfied only if the person to
whom the duty of protection and supervision is delegated fulfills it in a non-negligent
.manner. In other words, if the teacher or instructor fails to properly perform the
supervisory duty, then the employer-institution will be vicariously liable under the
doctrine of respondeat superior for all resulting injuries. In the absence of any such
employee negligence, the institution will be liable only for breaches of its own duties.
Id. at 974.
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In Garber v. Central School District No. 1131 a twelve year old
schoolboy was injured while playing a game called "shoot the
crow" in the school gymnasium. 32 None of the boys in the school
were permitted to leave the school premises after eating their noon
meal and all were required to spend the balance of the lunch period
in the school gymnasium. 33 While in the gymnasium, the boys
"were under the exclusive direction and control of a janitor,
without other supervision.' '134 The injured boy sued the school
district, but the trial court dismissed the case, apparently
determining that the defendant had not violated any duty owed to
the plaintiff. 135 The appellate court determined that the school
district may have abrogated both its common-law duty of due care
and its statutory obligation to establish rules and regulations
governing student conduct, and to carefully select qualified
supervisors for students engaged in recreational activities. 36 The
court held, therefore, that the plaintiff was entitled to a new trial to
determine whether the board of education was negligent for failing
to establish rules and regulations and for failing to select a qualified
37
supervisor. 1
The rationale expressed in Garber provides a sufficient basis to
hold a school administrator liable for failure to exercise due care in
selecting athletic coaches. Administrators must be cognizant of the
131. 251 A.D. 214, 295 N.Y.S. 850 (1937).
132. Garber v. Central School Dist. No. 1, 251 A.D. 214, -,
295 N.Y.S. 850, 853 (1937).
The game of" shoot the crow" was an acrobatic game played on two floor mats. Id. One boy would
lay on his back on the mat, "drawing his knees up against his chest, with the bottoms of his feet
upward." Id. One of the boys would then sit on the other boy's feet. Id. The janitor later joined the
game by becoming the "propelling medium." Id. The plaintiff sat on the janitor's feet and was
catapulted seven feet beyond the mat where he landed head first. Id. As a result of the fall, the plantiff

suffered serious injuries to his arm. Id.
133. Id. at__,
295 N.Y.S. at 852.
134. Id.
135. See id. at-,
295 N.Y.S. at 852, 859.
136. Id. at-,
295 N.Y.S. at 858. The court noted that neither the board of education nor its
members exercised any supervision over the children in any athletic activities conducted by the.
school, nor gave any attention to the athletic activities conducted during the noon hour in the
gymnasium. Id. at -, 295 N.Y.S. at 853. In addition, no instructor or any other qualified person
was present in the gym when the plaintiff's injury occurred. Id. at -,
295 N.Y.S. at 859. The
court also noted that there was no evidence that the janitor was qualified to supervise the children.
Id. at -,
295 N.Y.S. at 857. The court used the following language to describe the board of
education's violation of its duty of care:
[Allowing the janitor to supervise lunch hour activity] was a palpable failure to meet
the requirements of the common-law rule, as well as an evident neglect of the duty
imposed by the statute. It is indicative not only of a disregard of the statutory mandate
to make rules and regulations to establish order and discipline, but also to carefully
select suitable supervisors to whom the safety of children was to be entrusted while
under school restraint.

Id. at-_, 295 N.Y.S. at 858.
137. Id. at-_, 295 N.Y.S. at 859.
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need to adequately screen the records of applicants for coaching
positions to insure that they are qualified. 138 Administrators should
also consider whether applicants have had emergency first aid
training, especially when such training is mandated by state
statute. Failure to comply with state law could result in a finding
39
that the school district and administrator were negligent per se.1
Courts may also hold schools liable when athletic equipment
or facilities are found to be defective or deficient. 140 In Gerrity v.
Beatty "' the trial court dismissed a claim for relief in the plaintiff's
complaint which alleged that he had not been provided a properly
fitted football helmet, and that this caused his injury and
constituted negligence on the part of the school district. 142 The
Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that the plaintiff's claim
regarding ill fitting equipment should have been permitted to stand
since it represented an appropriate allegation that the school district
43
had failed to exercise ordinary care. 1
A school was similarly held not immune from potential
liability for furnishing a hockey player with a defectively designed
138. See Brittan v. State, 200 Misc. 743, __,
103 N.Y.S.2d 485, 488 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1951)
(school was negligent in permitting an unqualified student to supervise and conduct a physical fitness

test in which one of the student-participants was injured).
139. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 328A (1965). For a brief discussion of negligence

per se, see supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
140. See, e.g., Bush v. Norwalk, 122 Conn. 426, 189 A. 608 (1937) (school liable for injury
caused by unsturdy balance beam due to a slippery floor); Ardoin v. Evangeline Parish School Bd.,
376 So. 2d 372, 374 (La. Ct. App. 1979) (school board was negligent for piece of concrete in
basepaths that caused injury to a participant); Everett v. Bucky Warren, Inc., 376 Mass. 280, -,
380 N.E.2d 653, 659 (1978) (school held liable for supplying negligently designed helmet to hockey
player); see also WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 64, § 8.05, at 971 (educational institutions have duty
to provide suitable equipment and facilities for athletic and recreational activities); cf. Annotation,
Tort Liability of Public Schools and Institutions of Higher Learning for Accidents Associated with the
Transportationof Students, 34 A.L.R. 3d 1210, 1242-44 (1979) (liability of public schools for accidents
during transportation to and from athletic events).
141.71 Ul..2d 47, 373 N.E.2d 1323 (1978).
142. Gerrity v. Beatty, 71 111. 2d 47, -,
373 N.E.2d 1323, 1325 (1979). The plaintiff was
fifteen years old when he was severely injured making a tackle in a football game conducted by his
high school. Id. at -,
373 N.E.2d at 1324. The plaintiff filed a multicount suit against the
manufacturer of the football helmet, the attending physician, the hospital where he received
treatment, the city, and the school district. Id. The appeal to the Supreme Court of Illinois concerned
only the court alleging negligence by the school district for failure to provide proper safety
equipment. Id.
143. Id. at , 373 N.E.2d at 1326. The court noted that the complaint did not allege
negligent supervision on the part of teachers or other employees of the school. Id. If it had, the court
conceded that the claim would have been barred by a statutory exclusion that extended parental
immunity to teachers and other employees in the supervision of pupils. Id. at -,
373 N.E.2d at
1324, 1326. In contrast, the complaint alleged negligence for the separate act of furnishing
equipment alleged to be inadequate, ill fitting, and defective. Id. at __,
373 N.E.2d at 1326. The
court held that it would violate public policy to interpret the immunity statutes as relaxing the school
district's duty to use ordinary care to ensure that the equipment was fit for its intended purposes. Id.
The court reasoned that:
[P]ublic policy considerations argue rather strongly against any interpretation which
would relax a school district's obligation to insure that equipment provided for
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helmet in Everett v. Bucky Warren, Inc. 14 4 The helmet was designed
with large gaps, wide enough for a hockey puck to penetrate and
cause considerable head injury, and was inferior to one piece
helmets that were available from other manufacturers. 14 5 Based on
the coach's testimony that he knew the one piece helmet was safer,
and evidence that the helmet was defectively designed, the jury
returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of
$85,000.146 The trial court granted a defense motion for judgement
notwithstanding the verdict on the negligence claims and held that
the plaintiff had assumed the risk of his injuries by playing
hockey. 147 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reversed
the trial court's decision to set aside the jury's verdict on the
negligence claims. 148 The court held that there was sufficient
149 and the school liable. 150
evidence to hold both the manufacturer
students in connection with activities of this type is fit for the purpose. To hold school
districts to the duty of ordinary care in such matters would not be unduly
burdensome, nor does it appear to us to be inconsistent with the intended purposes of.
the School Code.
Id.
144. 376 Mass. 280, 380 N.E.2d 653 (1978). The plaintiff was seriously injured in a hockey
game when he was struck in the head by a puck. Everett v. Bucky Warren, Inc., 376 Mass. 280,
-,
380 N.E.2d 653, 655 (1978). At the time of the injury, the plaintiff was a member of the New
Preparatory School hockey team. Id. at-.,
380 N.E.2d at 656. The plaintiff was injured during a
hockey game with Brown University while attempting to block the shot of a Brown player. Id. The
puck penetrated into a gap of the plaintiff's helmet and struck him slightly above and in back of his
right ear. Id. The force of the puck fractured the plaintiff's skull. Id. As a result of the injury, the
plaintiff had a plate inserted in his skull and suffered from headaches indefinitely. Id. The helmet
worn by the plaintiff was manufactured by Pender and distributed by Bucky Warren, Inc., a retailer
in sporting goods. Id. at-,
380 N.E.2d at 656-57. The helmet was supplied to the plaintiff'by the
coach of the New Preparatory hockey team, who specially ordered the helmets on behalf of the
school. Id. at __,
380 N.E.2d at 657. The plaintiff brought an action against the manufacturer, the
retailer, and New Preparatory, alleging that the hockey helmet was negligently designed and that all
three defendants were liable in negligence for supplying the helmets. Id. The plaintiff also alleged
that the manufacturer and the retailer were liable on a strict liability basis. Id.
145. See id. at -, 380 N.E.2d at 658. The designer of the helmet wasJames Pender, who had
no engineering background. Id. The Pender helmet was not designed for safety reasons, but rather,
was designed in three pieces to facilitate adjustment. Id. The court also noted that Pender knew that
other manufacturers were producing one piece helmets, but he failed to make any. tests of his
own helmet to determine its safety. Id. at , 380 N.E.2d at 658-59. The court noted that Pender
candidly admitted that "the helmet was consciously designed so that there would be gaps between its
sections when it was properly adjusted; the larger the head of the wearer, the larger would be the
gaps." Id. at __,
380 N.E.2d at 658.
146. Id. at-_., 380 N.E.2d at 657-59.
147. Id. at __
, 380 N.E.2d at 657. The jury returned verdicts in favor of the plaintiff on both
negligence and strict liability claims. Id. Despite entering judgment for the defendants on the
negligence claims, the trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of $85,000 on the
strict liability counts since assumption of risk is not a defense to a strict liability claim. Id. at -,
380 N.E.2d at 657-58.
148. Id. at ___ 380 N.E.2d at 662.
149. Id. at __,
380 N.E.2d at 658-59. The court determined that the jury reasonably could
have concluded that the designer of the helmet "knew, or should have known, that a puck could
penetrate between the sections and cause serious injury to the wearer." Id. at
-, 380 N.E.2d at
658. In addition, the designer of the helmet was aware that other manufacturers were producing one
piece helmets, but failed to test his own helmet to determine whether it was safe. Id. at __,
380
N.E.2d at 658-59. Thus, the court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's
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The one North Dakota case alleging that high school officials
were liable for negligently causing an athlete's injury is Harding v.
New Rockford School DistrictNo. 1.151 On April 24, 1984, a track meet
was held in New Rockford involving the local high school and
Tolna High School. 152 The javelin event was conducted on the
infield simultaneously with other events being held on the track. 153
At approximately the same time the javelin event was underway,
Rochelle Harding, a member of the New Rockford team, went
under a rope separating the track and infield to get to the far sideof
the stadium to compete in a running event. 154 As Harding ran into
the throwing area, she was struck in the chest by a javelin and
155
suffered fatal injuries.
The athlete's mother filed a lawsuit against the New Rockford
and Tolna school districts alleging that the school districts were
negligent for their failure to provide adequate safety for the student
athletes. 15 6 The plaintiffs case centered on the argument that the
javelin event was extremely dangerous when not removed to a
location well away from the other events. 15 7 However, the jury did
finding that the manufacturer was negligent in the design of the helmet. Id. at __,
380 N.E.2d at
659.
150. Id. at-., 380 N.E.2d at 659. The court held that, as a supplier, the school "was required
to exercise reasonable care not to provide a chattel which it knew or had reason to know was
dangerous for its intended use." Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 289(b) comment m
1965)). Of special importance to the court was the fact that the high school team's coach was aware,
or should have been aware, because of his substantial experience in the game of hockey, that the one
piece helmet was available and that it was safer than the model purchased. Id. The court also
determined that the coach could be held to a higher standard of care and knowledge than an average
person because of his substantial experience in the game of hockey. Id.
151. Civ. No. 2220 (S.E.D.N.D. Mar. 11, 1986).
152. Complaint at 2, Harding v. New Rockford School Dist. No. I, Civ. No. 2220 (S.E.D.N.D.
Mar. 11, 1986).
153. Trial Memorandum of Defendant New Rockford School Dist. No. 1 at 1-2, Harding. The
javelin event was conducted in the infield area of the Westside Track in New Rockford, North
Dakota. Id. at 1. The area of the track where thejavelin event was held was roped off by stakes about
waist high and marked with banners. Plaintiff's Trial Memorandum at 5, Harding.
154. Plaintiff's Trial Memorandum at 5, Harding. Rochelle Harding was on her way to a relay
event scheduled to start while the javelin event was still underway. Id. Harding was late for the event
when her name was called over the public address system. Trial Memorandum of Defendant New
Rockford School Dist. No. 1 at 2. At approximately the same time, a New Rockford athlete was
taking his practice throws of the javelin. Plaintiff's Trial Memorandum at 4; Trial Memorandum of
Defendant New Rockford School Dist. No. 1 at 2. At the same time Rochelle Harding ducked under
the rope surrounding the javelin event area, the New Rockford athlete released the javelin on his
practice throw. Trial Memorandum of Defendant New Rockford School Dist. No. I at 2.
155. Trial Memorandum of Defendant New Rockford School Dist. No. 1 at 2.
156. See Complaint, Harding.
157. See id. at 3. Paragraph seven of the plaintiff's complaint alleged "[tjhat the javelin throw
event is by its nature inherently dangerous and hazardous, particularly when thrown in close
proximity to other ongoing events." Id. The plaintiff also alleged that the defendants breached
their duty to take adequate and reasonable steps to minimize the dangers and hazards of the javelin
event by failing to ensure that no participants entered the field while the javelin was being thrown.
Id. at 3-4. The North Dakota High School Activities Association allows the javelin throw to be
conducted on the infield if the area is appropriately cordoned off from the running track. Interview
with Robert King, Assistant Executive Secretary of the North Dakota High School Activities
Association (Oct. 10, 1979).
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not accept the plaintiff's arguments, and determined that the
defendant school districts had exercised reasonable158 and prudent
care in fulfilling their administrative responsibilities.

C.

LIABILITY OF COACHES

Athletic coaches are extremely vulnerable to claims of
negligence by injured athletes. Based on the direct control of
athletes and the supervisory responsibilities that a coach assumes,
the critical question is whether the coach exercised reasonable care
under the traditional reasonable person standard. This issue was
raised in Vendrell v. School DistrictNo. 26C 159 in which the plaintiff
alleged that his coaches failed to exercise reasonable care to protect
the players. 16 0 The plaintiff, a freshman playing in a high school
varsity football game, was injured when, while running with the
ball, he lowered his head at the instant two players from the
opposing team tackled him.1 6 1 As a result of the collision, the
plaintiff suffered a broken neck.' 6 2 The plaintiff alleged that the
defendant coaches had not provided "proper or sufficient
63
instruction.' 1
In approving a directed verdict for the defendants, the court
held that the coaches had, in fact, provided proper instructions
concerning physical conditioning and the proper method of
running with the ball. 164 The court also noted that all players had
received proper instruction regarding running with the ball,
tackling, and the proper action when about to be tackled. 65 The
158. Special Verdict, Harding v. New Rockford School Dist. No. 1, Civ. No. 2220
(S.E.D.N.D. Mar. 4, 1986). The jury found that Rochelle Harding was negligent, and that her
negligence was the direct and proximate cause of her death. Id.
159. 233 Or. 1, 376 P.2d 406 (1962).
160. Vendrell v. School Dist. No. 26C, 233 Or. 1,
-, 376 P.2d 406, 408 (1962).
161. Id. at-_, 376 P.2d at 409.
162. Id.
163. Id. at
-. , 376 P.2d at 412. The court interpreted the plaintiff's claim to allege that the
coaches "(1) did not instruct the plaintiff adequately in the manner of playing the game of football,
(2) should have told him that in playing football he might sustain injury, and (3) should have told
him that if he lowered his head and used it as a battering ram injury to his spine might ensue." Id.
164. Id. at -,
376 P.2d at 413-14. The coaches subjected the football team to extensive
training in the form of calisthenics, running, and practice. Id. at , 376 P.2d at 410, 413. In
addition, the training of the team included a program of classes concerning physical conditioning and
training rules. Id. at -,
376 P.2d at 410. One of the calisthenics was a "bull-neck" exercise
engaged in each day to strengthen the neck. Id. In addition, the players were taught to protect
themselves from blows. Id. The plaintiff conceded that the training program was intended to help the
students learn the plays and the fundamentals of football such as tackling, running, blocking and the
proper position of the head and body while in play." Id.
165. Id. at
-,
376 P.2d at 413. The court noted that the purpose of "the extensive
instructions and arduous practice" was to minimize injury to the players and make them better
football players. Id. Regarding a coach's responsibility, the court stated:

1986]

SPORTS LIABILITY

court's extensive analysis regarding the procedures followed by the
coaches in preparing their players for physical contact demonstrates
that, absent such a rigorous training program, the court may have
imposed liability for negligent supervision. Consequently, the
Vendrell case serves as a clear example of the standard of conduct
that courts will employ when evaluating whether coaches should be
held liable for breach of their duty of supervisory care.
Coaches must also be cognizant of player injuries and take
special care not to encourage participation in athletic activity that
might aggravate the individual's condition. 166 The leading case on
this issue, decided in 1931, is Morris v. Union High School District
A. 167 In Morris the father of an injured football player sued, alleging
negligence by the football coach.16 8 The plaintiff argued that the
coach had pressured the boy to play despite injuries suffered by the
boy two weeks earlier. 169 As a result of the coerced participation,
the boy suffered additional spinal and internal injuries.170 The
Washington Supreme Court reversed the lower court's dismissal of
the action, calling special attention to the coach's responsibility to
injured players.1 7 1 The court determined that a school district is
No one expects a football coach to extract from the game the body clashes that cause
bruises, jolts and hard falls. To remove them would end the sport. The coach's
function is to minimize the possibility that the body contacts may result in something
more than slight injury. The extensive calisthenics, running and other forms of
muscular exercise to which the defendant's coaches subjected the defendant's squad
were intended to place the players in sound physical condition so that they could
withstand the shocks, blows and other rough treatment with which they would meet in
actual play.
Id.
In addition to the claim of negligent instruction, the plaintiff alleged that the coaches had
negligently provided the plaintiff with ill-fitting safety equipment. Id. at 411-12. The court held for
the defendant, noting that the plaintiff had not brought the problem to the attention of a team
manager, coach or school official. Id. at-,
376 P.2d at 412. Vendrell admitted "that he had the
privilege of returning any of his equipment and of selecting a substitute." Id.
At least one court has held that a coach's duty to inspect equipment is part of the overall duty to
provide proper supervision. See Thomas v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 77 11. 2d 165, 395 N.E.2d 538
(1979). In Thomas the Illinois Supreme Court stated:
[Tihe school district has the authority to purchase andJurnish equipment to students.
This authority is not shared with teachers and coaches, who have instead the distinct
competence or authority to supervise the students and their use of that equipment. A
coach's duty to inspect the equipment is subsumed within his or her duty to supervise but does not
fall under the school district's authority to furnish.
Id. at -,
395 N.E.2d at 540 ("furnish" and "authority" emphasized in original; otherwise
emphasis added).
166. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text (coach's duty to prevent and treat injuries).
167. 160 Wash. 121,294 P.998 (1931).
168. Morris v. Union High School Dist. A, 160 Wash. 121,
, 294 P. 998,998 (1931).
169. Id. The boy had suffered injuries to his back and spine during practice. Id.
170. Id. The injuries to the boy's spine resulted in a tubercular condition which required a
number of major operations. Id.
171. Id. at -_, 294 P. at 999.
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liable for a player's injuries caused by the negligence of a coach who
knew, or should have known, that the student was physically
17 2
unable to play, but directed the student to participate.
One final consideration that directly affects a coach's
negligence liability is the manner in which injured players are
handled. When a player has suffered an injury, a coach may be
173
liable for any aggravation caused by improper movement.
Consequently, a coach should exercise special care when the
injuries involve the head, neck, back, and spine. In these
situations, a coach's actions will be evaluated in accordance with
what a reasonable prudent person with similar training and
17
experience would have done in similar circumstances. 4
Additionally, a coach may also be expected to recognize when a
player's injury is extraordinary and requires immediate medical
aid. 175
D.

LIABILITY OF OFFICIALS

Officials are responsible for any action that falls below the
ordinary standard of care required in tort law. In this respect,
officials share responsibility with school management regarding
questions of whether environmental considerations require
suspension or delay of the game.17 6 Failure to cease play during a
lightning storm, or due to condensation on the playing floor, or due
172. Id. The court stated the school district's responsibility as follows:
It certainly cannot be that a [school] district can maintain a football team, have one of
its teachers as trainer and coach, who knows, or in the exercise of reasonable care
should know, that one of the players is physically unfit to enter the game, but
nevertheless permits, persuades, and coerces such player to play, and in the event of
injury to the player be held not liable for such negligent and careless act of its officer or
agent.
.d. But see Thomas v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 77 Ill. 2d 165, -,
395 N.E.2d 538, 541 (1979)
(requiring that, under immunity statute, a coach's misconduct be willful or wanton in order tn
impose liability on him or her).
173. See, e.g., Welch v. Dunsmuir Union High School Dist., 326 P.2d 633, 635-36 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1958) (coach may be liable for directing another to carry a severely injured player off the
field); see also SCHUJIERT, supra note 30, S 7.4[A][61 (discussing coach's liability for moving or
improperly treating an injured athlete).
174. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text (discussion of the standard of care).
175. See, e.g., Mogabgab v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 239 So. 2d 456 (La. Ct. App. 1970). In
Mogabgab the plaintiff, a high school football player, was participating in "wind sprints" on the
second day of practice for the team. Id. at 458. The plaintiff displayed fatigue and collapsed. Id. He
was assisted to a school bus by two of his teammates and became nauseous and vomited. Id. The
football coaches, although aware of the plaintiff's condition, failed to call a physician for over two
hours. Id. at 459. The plaintiff died of heat stroke and exhaustion. Id. at 459-60. The coaches were
held liable for negligently denying the plaintiff access to medial treatment. Id. at 460-61.
176. See NATIONAL FEDERATION OF STATE HIGH SCHOOL AssociATIoNs, 1985 & 1986 FOOTBALL
HANDBOOIK 11-12 (1985) [hereinafter NFSHSA FOOTBALL HANDBOOK].
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to darkness when proper lighting is not available, are examples of
conduct that may be considered negligent.
Of all the responsibilities assumed by a sports official, one of
the most important is the duty of proper supervision. In Carabba v.
Anacortes School District No. 201111 the plaintiff athlete was injured
during a wrestling match as the result of an illegal hold that the
referee failed to see.1 7 8 As a result of the illegal hold, the plaintiff
suffered injuries that resulted in permanent paralysis below the
neck.' 7 9 The plaintiff subsequently filed a suit, based on the
referee's negligent conduct, against the school districts that
sponsored the wrestling meet.18 0 The jury returned a verdict for the
defendants. 1 8 ' On appeal, however, the Supreme Court of
Washington reversed and held that the school districts owed a duty
of proper supervision to athletes that may have been violated by the
82
actions of the referee.
Besides the responsibility to inspect the playing field,' 83
officials also have an obligation to insure that all players are
wearing the required equipment. 8 4 The National Federation of
State High Associations requires that prior to a football game,
the referee and umpire ask the head coaches to verify that all player
equipment conforms with game rules.' 8 5 Any questionable items
177.72 Wash. 2d 939, 435 P.2d 936 (1967).
, 435 P.2d 936, 939
178. Carabba v. Anacortes School Dist. No. 103, 72 Wash. 2d 939, __
(1967). In Carabba the plaintiffwas involved in a high school wrestling match. Id. at -, 435 P.2d at
939. His opponent was well ahead on points and was trying to pin the plaintiff. Id. In the course of

this attempt, the boys rolled to the comer of the main mat where small side mats were placed against
the main mat. Id. The referee noticed a separation between the main mat and the side mat and
moved over to close the gap to protect the boys should they roll in the direction of the separation. Id.
In attending to the gap, the referee's attention was momentarily diverted from the boys. Id. It was
during this momentary lapse in supervision that the opponent applied an illegal hold to the plaintiff.
Id. At the end of the round, defendant released his hold and the plaintiff slumped to the mat, unable
to move due to the severance of a major portion of his spinal cord. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at -, 435 P.2d at 938. The plaintiff alleged that the school districts were vicariously
liable for the negligence of the referee. Id. The plaintiff alleged that the referee was negligent for
inadequate supervision and for "'[violating the provisions of the 1963 official Wrestling Guide of the
National Collegiate Athletic Association.'" Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at -. , 435 P.2d at 947-48. The court noted that the wrestling matches were conducted
"under the auspices" of the school districts because they actively encouraged participation by
students, provided coaches, and provided the premises and equipment for the wrestling matches. Id.
at -, 435 P.2d at 947. Consequently, the court held that the school owed a duty to the student
participants to provide nonnegligent supervision. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY S
214 comment a (1957)).
183. See NATIONAL FEDERATION OF STATE HIGH SCHOOL ASSOCIATIONS, 1984 AND 1985 NATIONAL
FEDERATION EDITION, FOOTBALL OFFICIALS MANUAL 9 (1984) (referee shall "inspect the playing field
markings and pylons and order the removal of any hazards on or near the field") [hereinafter cited as
NFSHSA OFFICIALS MANUAL].
184. Id. at 7; see also NFSHSA FOOTBALL HANDBOOK, supra note 176, at 6.
185. NFSHSA OFFICIALS MANUAL, supra note 183, at 7; NFSHSA FOOTBALL HANDBOOK, supra
note 176, at 6. The NFSHSA Football Handbook provides:
The responsibility for insuring that all players are legally equipped is that of the head
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are examined by the umpire who is the "final authority on
legality of player equipment.' '186 This responsibility, which is
clearly enunciated in several National Federation publications,
establishes the equivalent of a statutory duty of care. 18 7 Officials
must perform such affirmative obligations diligently, since failure
to do so could constitute negligence.
CONCLUSION
Although many athletic injuries are the result of participant
misconduct, both intentional and unintentional, injured athletes
are beginning to look to third parties in order to expand tort claims.
These parties necessarily include school administrators, coaches,
and sports officials. Contemporary cases indicate that courts are
becoming more receptive to such claims. Third parties have been
held liable for high school sports injuries under the theory that they
owe a duty to athletes to provide an environment free from
unreasonably dangerous conditions. This is not to say that all
persons associated with high school sports become the insurers of
an athlete's safety, or that they will be held liable for injuries that
result from physical contact within the parameters of game rules.
However, it must be emphasized that there is an increased
recognition that certain third parties are in a position to regulate
sporting competition,
and the environmental conditions
surrounding athletic activities, in such a manner that renders them
vulnerable to a negligence claim.
Athletes do not assume the risk of all potential injuries simply
by virtue of their participation in an athletic contest. The defense of
assumption of risk only protects third parties to the extent that the
injuries suffered were the foreseeable result of conduct that could
reasonably have been anticipated by the athlete. If the injuries were
caused by conduct that was not within the foreseeable risks
assumed by an athlete, school administrators, coaches, and officials
may be held liable.
As a result, there must be a renewed emphasis placed on
educating those persons associated with secondary school sports
coach. Prior to the game, the referee and umpire will visit each teams' dressing room.
The head coach must verify to the referee, inthe presence of the umpire, that his players are equipped
in compliance with the rules.
Id. (emphasis added).
186. NFSHSA OFFICIALS MANUAL, supra note 183, at 9; seealso NFSHSA FOOTBALL HANDBOOK,
supra note 176, at 6.
187. For a discussion of the statutory duty of care, see supra notes 79-88 and accompanying text.
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regarding their potential negligence liability for athletic injuries.
School superintendents are in a good position to implement such a
program for athletic coaches, and state high school associations can
utilize clinics and rules seminars as vehicles for making sports
officials more cognizant of the consequences of their on-the-field
conduct. Coaches also bear the responsibility of ensuring that
players are taught proper techniques and are informed of the
possible injuries that could result from failure to follow these
instructions. Hopefully, this increased attention will make high
school athletic programs safer, and will reduce the number of
negligence claims made by injured athletes.

